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This paper draws on concepts of trust to analyse recent policies affecting public/third 
sector relationships, examining the parallel policy strands of competition, ‘command 
and control’ mechanisms and the community turn in shaping recent cultures of 
relationships. The paper draws on examples from two empirical studies in English 
inner-city areas to explore ways in which power and regulatory frameworks exerted 
through dominant organisational cultures and arrangements undermine the independent 
approaches to communication and action, necessary to develop innovative work and 
organisational learning within and across sectors.  
State bodies have behaved as though trust in their actions is a given, while increasingly 
shifting responsibilities for service delivery and risks of failure to others. Drawing on 
our research, we argue that the increase in market cultures and regulatory frameworks 
have damaged trust in cross-sector relationships, promoting divisive interests and risk-
averse behaviours, restricting the autonomy, innovation and community action 
presumed in the Big Society agenda. We conclude by highlighting issues that need to be 
addressed to ensure the development of collaboration with community-based providers 
in the future including a focus on the processes and relational spaces which will enable 
positive alternatives. 
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From the Third Sector to the Big Society: how changing UK 
government policies have eroded third sector trust  
 
Introduction 
Third sector organisations
1
 (TSOs), in the UK, as internationally, have taken on a growing share 
of services previously delivered through statutory agencies. Simultaneously, debates about their 
changing roles and relationships with the state, and the related effects of outsourcing and 
partnership work have grown. However, issues of trust in state-third sector relationships, 
especially those involving small, community-based third sector organisations, have had limited 
study. A growing literature has considered the effects of changes in public services on third 
sector agencies, highlighting the growing emphasis on competition and regulatory and 
performance frameworks in this mixed welfare economy (Baines et al. 2011). As pressures on 
public sector spending grow, there is a shifting dynamic between ‘old’ and ‘new’ values, as the 
distinctive character of TSOs gives way to regimes legitimised through dominant managerial 
cultures (Milbourne, 2009) and entrepreneurial approaches (Macmillan, 2011). Consequently, 
trust, which formerly underpinned varied relationships between public and third sector agencies, 
has been widely displaced by formalised arrangements which control and manage meanings, re-
shaping and normalising an asymmetry of relationships between state and third sectors.  
TSO relationships with public funders have, for some time, maintained a tension between 
autonomy and accountability. Autonomy is necessary to sustain the goals and actions mandated 
                                                 
1
 We have retained the term third sector because of its international currency despite recent political 
changes in the UK, whereby the Office for the Third Sector has been renamed the Office for Civil 
Society. Civil Society encompasses wider associational and individual actions in society, where this 
paper concentrates on formally constituted charities, voluntary and community or not-for-profit 
organisations. 
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by community members and service users, to innovate and to respond to changing conditions. It 
allows individual and organisational learning and learning shared with funding bodies and other 
TSOs. Accountability is necessary to maintain trust that public resources are being used 
honestly and for activities that contribute to the public good. Over 13 years, New Labour 
showed courage in substantially increasing the resources allocated to TSOs but timidity in 
trusting TSOs to use the resources wisely. Conversely, the Coalition Government’s Big Society 
agenda holds out a promise of greater autonomy while drastically reducing financial and 
organisational support (Pattie and Johnston, 2011). The issue for both public funders and TSOs 
is to manage this inescapable trade-off between autonomy and accountability constructively. 
This article considers challenges to inter-organisational relationships as changes in the UK third 
sector environment have accelerated, with reforms and reduced resources in welfare provision; 
the promotion of community engagement; and the focus on civil society and voluntary 
interventions as ways to tackle economic recession (Cabinet Office, 2010). The article initially 
considers different approaches to understanding trust and examines these alongside policy 
changes affecting the third sector generated by the previous and current Governments (HM 
Treasury and UK Cabinet Office 2007; Office for Civil Society, 2010). The article contrasts the 
limited and positivist notion of trust contained in the commonly used ABI – ability, 
benevolence, integrity – framework (Mayer et al. 1995) with the critical theory based approach 
of Hardy et al (1998). The latter focuses on power relationships and draws attention to how 
power masquerades as trust and suborns the less powerful through control of the discourse.  
Drawing on studies of TSOs in two English inner city areas, the article then examines inter-
organisational relationships using concepts of trust to frame and analyse the data. These 
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examples show how the ideological privileging of market-style relationships and the imposition 
of inappropriate performance measurement impair trust, inhibiting the TSOs’ successful 
operation. Rather than the co-production of targets, we observed disillusioned TSO managers, 
staff and users, resulting sometimes in resistance to change, which adversely affected both 
accountability and autonomy. 
 The fieldwork for the empirical studies included in this article was completed, by one of the 
authors, during the New Labour administration but the article also reflects on continuities and 
changes arising from the Coalition Government’s Big Society agenda. The rhetoric of Big 
Society suggests greater freedom for organisations to set their own objectives (Cabinet Office, 
2010), yet the accelerated marketisation of public services, increasingly large contracts and 
encouragement to private sector providers (Slocock, 2012) are leading to a growing 
corporatisation of services and reduced public accountability (Bennett, 2011).  
In devolving greater responsibility to ‘communities’, ‘Big Society’ also rests on the notion of a 
consensual society where the aims of local individuals, organisations, government and other 
powerful actors are unproblematically in alignment. As Brent (2009) underlines, community is 
essentially conflictual, and occluding such conflict trivialises the advocacy role that some TSOs 
adopt in the interests of less powerful social groups. Analysis of Big Society rhetoric suggests a 
fragile future for community organisations whose goals challenge those of government: 
compliance and possession of appropriate cultural capital and discourse will determine winners 
in future funding competitions (Coote, 2011).  
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The article now turns to examining different approaches to understanding trust before describing 
the empirical research and then applying these approaches to the data. It then discusses 
implications for more successful cross-sector relationships, innovation and learning. 
Framing trust relationships: moving from trust to control 
Building and sustaining trust in inter-organisational relationships, as Bachmann (2001) 
identifies, may be challenging and more complex than often acknowledged in literature. Much 
research conceptualises trust as resulting from benevolence of the trustee to the truster (Mayer et 
al. 1995), or argues, as Grey and Garsten (2001: 233) do, that trust and predictable behaviour 
are mutually reinforcing. However, these understandings overlook power inequalities and the 
importance of communicative action (Habermas 1984) in underpinning organisational 
relationships and motivation in service delivery. Many organisational relationships encompass 
goodwill but far fewer involve participants on an equal basis or offer space for exploring 
differences of approach which could generate more creative approaches but might depend on 
extending trust and entail considerable risk (Bachmann et al. 2001). More commonly, 
hierarchical arrangements and specified transactions underpin cross-sector relationships, 
controlling risk but undermining both trust and motivation for mutual learning, since learning 
requires the possibility of audiences for suppressed voices (Clegg et al 2005). 
Hardy et al. (1998) explore the difference between trust relationships and power relationships 
masquerading as trust. They suggest (:79) two forms of trust: spontaneous and generated; and 
two forms of power based masquerade: manipulation (where dominant actors manage 
meanings), and capitulation (where subordinate actors surrender to dominant arrangements). 
-6- 
Trust and masquerade are distinguished by differing processes for constructing meaning and 
allocating risk. In trust relationships meaning is co-created and ‘trust results from a 
communicative process in which shared meanings either exist, or are created through a 
reciprocal relationship,’ (Hardy et al. 1998: 71). This necessarily involves all participants and 
demands communication which allows for examining differences and conflicts. 
As Bachmann (2001) elaborates, patterns of power and trust operate at both inter-personal and 
structural levels. When what appears to be trust is a facade for power, meaning is managed, 
distorted or imposed by the dominant participant. In this masquerade, speech is strategic and 
agreement is suborned by the dominant organisational partner. Predictable but imbalanced 
relationships may be maintained based on assumed cultures or sets of arrangements; however, 
managed meanings typically exclude or marginalise those with limited power, who may 
increasingly mistrust, or become disillusioned with, the process. Disillusionment and 
experiences of exclusion have been TSO concerns during the last decade of policies (Taylor, 
2011). If shared meanings are to emerge, rather than meanings being managed in ways that 
maintain or increase power differentials, power within communicative processes needs to be 
recognised and addressed. It is only when trust is present, whether spontaneous or generated, 
that speech approaches emancipatory discourse (Habermas 1984).  
If partners learn to communicate in ways that produce shared meanings, trust-building can be 
successful. Governance through targets and performance indicators could be trust based, if these 
were co-developed and agreed. The previous UK government declared a similar perspective, 
indicating a wish:  
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that the third sector remains at the heart of measures to improve public services including 
as contractors…as advisers influencing the design of services and as innovators from which 
the public sector can learn. (HM Treasury 2007: 49) 
While the discourse differs somewhat, emphasising locality and individuals rather than 
organisations, the Coalition government’s position (Cabinet Office, 2010) is markedly 
analogous. Regardless of political stance, recent experience in the UK and elsewhere (Burnley 
et al. 2005, Moxham and Boaden 2007, Bennett 2011) indicates that targets continue to be 
centrally defined with minimal space for negotiation and represent an exercise in power; Ellis 
(2009) argues that the intensification of non-negotiated monitoring regimes has stifled 
flexibility and organisational learning. Recent policy aspires to reduce the burden of audit in the 
interests of local responsiveness. However, as result of the rapid expansion of public service 
outsourcing, prescriptive service criteria and performance outcomes are being unilaterally 
imposed by prime contractors holding mega-contracts on local TSO service providers (Crawley 
and Watkin 2011, Marsden 2011).  
Walgenbach’s (2001) research on the spread of standards and performance certification 
demonstrates that highly specified frameworks have failed to fulfil their intended purpose of 
improving cross-institutional trust. As Shaw and Allen (2006) argue, where trust-based 
relationships are dominant, narratives around activities and achievements often guide funders’ 
assessment of the value of services more than measurable indicators. Targets do more than 
require a level of performance: they structure discourse and define the categories of what is 
meaningful and what is marginal.  
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Trust between public and third sectors: multi-layered relationships 
Relationships between TSOs and state agencies are not neat, boundaried or homogenous; they 
are multi-layered and dynamic, influenced both by horizontal and vertical policy environments 
(Alcock and Kendall, 2011). Historically, many TSOs were either wholly or partly, grant funded 
through public bodies; and service provision was often co-constructed with local government. 
With the decline of grant funding, contracts for TSOs to provide diverse services and projects 
on behalf of public agencies have grown, often displacing co-delivery with a hierarchical 
dependence on outsourced funding The growth of widespread service contracts, with associated 
regulatory controls and risk management has produced asymmetric power relationships, played 
out through the management of performance outcomes and transfer of risks. As Muehlberger 
(2007) describes in the private sector, despite provision being outsourced, arrangements have 
been subject to progressively greater control, delimiting activities and approaches.  
The multiple policy pressures on TSOs to engage with other agencies and individuals, within 
and across sectors, and to draw on civil society actors and volunteers have intensified. Funding 
is often a key driver; and both complexity and formality in relationships and governance have 
correspondingly grown (Maier and Meyer, 2011). . This stress on collaboration reflects 
continuity in strategy from previous to current UK governments, often initiated through 
formally constituted joint boards, such as Local Strategic Partnerships or Neighbourhood 
Councils. A proliferation of multi-agency projects have engaged in joint service delivery but 
Taylor’s (2006) research highlights the differing levels of power and influence within 
partnerships. TSOs have also carried a continuing historic role as advocates for individuals or 
communities, representing their interests and unmet needs to a statutory agency: a relationship 
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that potentially conflicts with other arrangements. While new community organisers (promised 
to energise the Big Society) will pursue elements of this community work, the withdrawal of 
funding from multiple projects and new workers often from outside localities, mean a 
significant loss of community expertise and a growth in mistrust (NCIA 2011; Taylor 2011). 
TSOs and public bodies may therefore be simultaneously engaged in several different types of 
relationships, and relationships that build trust at one level, as when a public agency involves a 
TSO in identifying needs for local services, are disrupted by interactions at another, when 
competitive contracts for services are introduced. In later examples, we explore the implications 
of moving from grant-based to contractual relationships; and of cross-sector planning and 
delivery work. Like Carmel and Harlock (2008), we examine ways that recent devolution of 
service delivery and partnership work have extended the governable terrain to agencies 
previously outside state governance, effectively undermining trust-based relationships.  
As Hardy et al. (1998) note, in trust-based relationships risk is shared, while in masquerades 
risk is disproportionately carried by the subordinate participant. Joint enterprise and joint 
service provision are typically characterised by trust relationships, though these may evolve 
gradually; and trust is assumed to emerge from equal, though distinct, contributions. In contrast, 
while contracted service provision may be governed by trust, procurement and contracting more 
frequently involve hierarchical power relationships (O’Brien 2006; Baines et al, 2011). These 
may appropriate the language of trust but often coerce consensus and restrict alternative 
approaches, so generating ‘a new brutalism’ in intra- and inter-sector relationships (Hoggett et 
al. 2009:157). 
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Contracting is, of course, not new but grew under the previous Conservative Government in the 
1990s. Several features uncovered in this research are reflected in Scott and Russell’s (2001) 
earlier work, including the distraction of organisations from their core aims in order to chase 
money and targets. They also noted that purchasers under-valued the role of volunteers and the 
community base of TSOs focusing on service outputs rather than the local impacts of provision. 
In contracted services, the trust basis has been superseded by client/contractor relationships, 
often derived from private sector models (see e.g. Lacity and Willcocks 2009) but these may 
translate poorly into public service settings. Increasingly larger contracts have encouraged the 
Tesco-isation of TSOs in an escalating marketplace (Alcock and Kendall, 2011), producing 
mergers and consequent mission drift as TSOs adopt more entrepreneurial behaviours.  
Lessons from other sectors are valuable here. Reviewing outsourcing, Weeks and Feeny (2008: 
140-1) identify three types of trust: personal, competence-based and motivational. Personal trust 
is based on a belief in the personal integrity of project partners which may be undermined by 
mission drift; while competence-based trust rests on a belief in the other’s professionalism 
potentially eroded through operational problems. Motivational trust is based on joint 
opportunities for reward from success and joint exposure to penalties from failure – trust 
underpinned by appropriate risk- and reward-sharing mechanisms. Comparing these definitions 
with the commonly used ABI – ability, benevolence, integrity – framework applied to 
understanding trust (Mayer et al. 1995), personal trust parallels integrity and competence-based 
parallels ability. However motivational trust differs from the concept of benevolence: while 
benevolence is individual, often voluntaristic, and carries no obligation, motivational–based 
trust assumes joint endeavour and a two-way relationship.  
-11- 
Hardy et al.’s (1998) discussion of generated trust suggests that trust develops with experience 
of the other. However, McKnight et al. (1998) argue that people frequently start by trusting but 
that this can be cemented or dissipated depending on subsequent actions. Disposition to trust 
(Mayer et al. 1995) varies depending on local context and cultural factors (Hofstede 1980). 
Despite the high profile given to charities and community organisations in the Big Society 
agenda (Maude, 2010), the early welcome accorded to strategies concerned with localism and 
devolution of power has been short lived, as third sector services across many fields lose 
funding and face closure (Crawley and Watkin, 2011; Toynbee 2011a).   
Grey and Garston (2001: 246) highlight the fragile nature of ‘all forms of trust’ and argue that 
significant (post-bureaucratic) organisational changes demand a re-casting of shared social 
practices from which to construct trust-based relationships. In changed or innovative 
environments the security of shared rules, discourse and values underpinning predictable 
practices are interrupted, producing a precarious environment for trust, and little prospect of the 
hoped-for growth in community engagement. McKnight et al. (1998: 480) identify more 
specific conditions for strengthening trust. Their construct of unit grouping which places ‘the 
other person in the same category as oneself’ identifies initial trust being secured at an 
interpersonal and group level through a tendency ‘to share common goals’. This unit grouping 
would apply where a TSO and a public agency co-operate in a common endeavour. However, to 
maintain trust, both parties must exhibit trusting and trust-worthy behaviour and the conditions 
for motivational trust must be present. The poor record of the Labour government’s Compacts 
in building good communications and fair contracting practices between public and third sector 
agencies (Zimmeck 2010) illustrates a failed joint enterprise undermined through conflicting 
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priorities, despite emphasis on the importance of TSOs in community trust building (HM 
Treasury, 2007).  
Comparing recent governments, there are similarities but also key differences. Previously, the 
need to improve relationships between the third sector and different levels of government, 
reducing excessive regulation, was eventually acknowledged (Cabinet Office 2009); now 
responsibility for effectiveness and responsiveness of services is devolved to community 
providers, individuals or to market forces. State agencies can then retreat from the need to 
improve inter-organisational relationships; and from democratic accountability for services. 
Consequently there is a failure to address the problematic facets of the relationship between the 
state, service providers and service users: crucial elements in the development of improved 
services and citizen engagement.  
New Labour’s rhetoric of joined-up services, partnerships and new localism (Aspden and Birch 
2005) is echoed in the Coalition’s Big Society agenda and the Localism Bill but arrangements 
are now focused on local volunteers and entrepreneurial activities, coupled with cross-sector 
delivery of public services. Labour’s preference for outsourcing to third sector providers who 
secure a level of public trust as acting in the public good (Nevile 2010) has now been 
superseded by a market where size and price displace intrinsic value. Where markets are 
rationalised to drive down costs, trust in services and providers may be lost; and where much 
public money has been withdrawn from local projects, new community organisers will face a 
challenging task of rebuilding trust relationships with user groups or their representatives. 
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The unresolved contradictions in recent government strategies between aspirations to localism 
and the desire to secure the lowest prices by bundling services into giant contracts which 
excludes all but the largest organisations, are graphically illustrated in Toynbee’s (2011b) 
example: 
The head of Capita, the outsourcing company, told the Financial Times he had been assured 
by [cabinet minister] Francis Maude that the "big society" would not get in the way of large 
firms taking the lion's share of contracts.  
As Taylor (2006) has shown, discontinuities in funding and policy, and power differentials often 
undermine cross-agency planning and delivery negating the inclusive rhetoric surrounding 
localism and open collaboration. This tendency has accelerated under the Big Society to the 
extent that 70% of voluntary sector chief executives do not believe ‘the Government respects 
and values the voluntary sector as a partner’ (ACEVO, 2011: 22) 
Trust, risk and innovation 
The current government, like the previous, recognises the value of diversity of organisations in 
promoting enterprising solutions to social challenges and the multiple opportunities for those 
willing to adopt an entrepreneurial spirit (Office for Civil Society 2010: 6). Recommending 
that funding bodies should not be ‘overly “risk averse” in making funding decisions’ (HM 
Treasury 2006:10), recent government strategy (OCS 2010) similarly argues against uniform 
and heavily specified frameworks of control, yet apparently ignores the acceleration of such 
frameworks as public sector outsourcing has spread. Therefore, while aspirations towards trust-
based relationships are stated, the willingness of funders to adopt this advice, to extend trust, 
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share risks and welcome alternatives is little evident in the construction of contracts for services 
or community projects (Milbourne, 2009). Research on outsourcing from other fields illustrates 
the benefits of risk-sharing and trust-based approaches (e.g. Weeks and Feeny 2008; Lacity and 
Willcocks 2009), contrasting with the short-termism often characterising TSO experiences. 
Government agencies carry significant risks for quality of provision, such as through poor 
service quality threatening success; lack of innovation jeopardising new policy delivery; and 
inadequate information sharing leaving gaps in provision (Kurunmäki and Miller 2004). 
However, they have sought to control, or alternatively to abdicate responsibility, rather than 
sharing or mitigating such risks. TSOs delivering services, however, additionally carry the risks 
for organisational viability and survival, which are exacerbated the smaller the size of the TSO. 
Large national TSOs are exposed to containable financial risk but unlimited reputational risk 
(Power et al. 2009); smaller community-based organisations carry both reputational risk and 
potentially fatal financial risk. 
While Grey and Garsten (2001) claim that trust comes from exercising control through ensuring 
predictability, Ghoshal and Moran (1996: 24) argue that trust and risk management, utilising 
detailed regulatory frameworks, are inversely related. Rigorous specification signals that 
controllees are neither trusted nor trustworthy; and ‘surveillance… threatens the controllee's 
personal autonomy and decreases his or her intrinsic motivation.’ Similarly, at the 
organisational level, audit surveillance, far from deterring opportunistic behaviour, may actively 
encourage it, enhancing the potential for moral hazard. 
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In analysing inter-organisational alliances, de Man and Roijakkers (2009: 77) drawing on Das 
and Teng’s work argue that ‘two elements of risk are particularly important: relational risk (that 
partners will deceive each other) and performance risk (that the alliance will not deliver the 
expected results)’. Public agencies, increasingly concerned with value for money, tend to 
prioritise performance risks, often discounting relational risks. However, de Man and 
Roijakkers identify high performance risks and low relational risks as generally best managed 
through trust-based governance. The extent to which command and control or trust-based state-
TSO relationships apparently prevail is explored further through our examples.  
The UK public sector, as elsewhere, has operated with a growing focus on audit and 
performance measurement, inherent in service contracts and the dominant managerial cultures 
of public agencies (Clarke et al. 2000). These cultures have similarly transformed management 
practices in third sector work through coercive and mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). The escalation of data collection can readily erode autonomy without ensuring 
accountability, providing ‘rituals of verification’ (Power 1997:145) and exacerbating the 
inevitable tension between accountability and autonomy. Many TSOs experience data reporting 
as intrusive and time-consuming surveillance (Milbourne, 2009) signalling a lack of trust 
(Hoecht 2006) and creating an atmosphere where concealment is a rational response. 
Conversely, strengthening trust allows an environment that moves from blaming to learning, 
and supports innovation (Willcocks and Craig, 2009).  
The scope of the studies  
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The article now draws on data from two studies in different English inner-city areas which 
focused on changing relationships between the local state and TSOs. Like Jäger and Beyes 
(2010) we argue the value of in-depth perspectives for illuminating broader trends. The first 
study, in Rushley
2
, involved case studies of three small but longstanding community-based 
organisations providing education for disengaged young people. 112 individuals contributed to 
the study which involved one of the authors in conducting some 50 interviews, 30 observations 
and additional focus groups over nearly four years; and included management committee 
members, staff, volunteers and young people, and key local government managers.  
The second study was commissioned by a large local authority, Wharton, and undertaken by 
one author in 2006-7, with interviews taking place over a few months. This had the advantage 
of providing a snapshot of participants’ perceptions, as they faced funding changes towards the 
end of the financial year. It involved some 50 interviews across different TSOs providing 
services for children and young people, and included local government service managers.  
Both studies were located in relatively deprived English inner-city areas with diverse 
populations, including significant numbers of recent refugees. Several neighbourhoods in both 
areas were ranked high in Indices of Local Deprivation (Price Waterhouse 2005) and the areas 
overall have been involved in neighbourhood regeneration and community participation 
initiatives. Consequently, new agencies and cross-sector partnerships have emerged, and have 
gained service delivery contracts alongside longstanding community organisations with 
successful local track records.  
                                                 
2
 All locations, organisations and  individuals are pseudonyms. 
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The studies examined relationships between TSOs and local government, exploring experiences 
of changes to funding arrangements and cross-sector relationships. In the first case, TSOs’ 
experiences of negotiating formal contracts for previously grant-funded services were observed. 
In the second, the study was conducted as new arrangements for commissioning services (Local 
Area Agreements) were being implemented.  
Both studies examined respondents’ perceptions of communications and relationships with local 
government officers; their experiences of service commissioning, contracting and monitoring 
relationships; the effects of changes on service activities; and changes in role related to user 
groups. The studies used qualitative coding methods to analyse and compare data from different 
sources (Glaser 1992), employing perspectives of critical social research (Harvey 1990) to 
question the consequences of changes in specific localities. While the second study was of 
limited duration, together the studies have enriched insights into the continuing effects of 
changes on cross-sector relationships. In what follows, examples are organised thematically. 
This article explores only some aspects of the research related to our analysis of trust and other 
themes arising from the data are considered elsewhere (Milbourne 2009).  
Findings 
In analysing data from these studies, there was little evidence of spontaneous trust (Hardy et al. 
1998); and the focus here is on examples where trust is generated from mutual efforts; or where 
trust is identified as a masquerade, with cross-sector relationships largely determined by power 
relations. We also consider how trust has been eroded or is subject to threat through the actions 
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or inactions of one of the parties and, drawing on the earlier discussion, explore the basis for 
trust or mistrust in the relationships and factors affecting the fragility of trust. 
Moving away from joint endeavour: from trust to control 
Initially we examine situations where joint endeavours have shifted to contractually based 
relationships, considering the effects on trust between the parties. In Rushley, key informants –
longstanding staff and management body members from the three TSOs – commented on 
transitions in relationships with the local education authority (LEA), as they moved from 
receiving grant funding for providing services for young people excluded or truanting from 
school, to becoming service contractors. One significant change was that most TSO staff had 
been employed by the LEA and seconded to the organisations, with the LEA carrying 
employment risks such as sickness and redundancy costs. In the proposed contracts, the staff 
were to be employed directly by the TSOs, with consequent risks and costs. A second key 
change was that the LEA liaison officer, Claire, who was familiar with the three TSOs’ work 
and had established a mutual trust relationship, became redundant and was replaced by a 
contracts’ link officer who had little knowledge of their work. The TSOs’ relationship with 
Claire illustrates all three types of trust: personal, motivational and competence-based. A TSO 
management committee (MC) member described Claire as someone who: 
understands and values what we do. She wants us to succeed with young people as much as 
we do. She shares our concerns, knows what it’s like …she has that background and 
knowledge, she’d support staff when the going’s tough. (Anna, TSO 1) 
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Trust was generated through a willingness to explore difficulties and share expertise, facilitating 
learning and innovation. A joint language of what constitutes success was generated; and Claire 
visited the organisations, monitoring achievements through narrative and observation, as much 
as through reports on measured outcomes - which the LEA increasingly required. Good 
personal relationships were developed over some 5 years, establishing positive motivation for 
improving services through joint endeavour, sharing problems and achievements. Mutual trust 
in the competence of the other grew from valuing, and knowledge of, the other’s work; shared 
understandings of services; and jointly constructed contexts for meaningful communications. 
With the introduction of more formal contractual relationships, lines of communication 
changed. Not surprisingly, the decision to remove Claire’s role provoked personal antipathy 
towards the new officer. Visits to the organisations became rare and TSO workers identified a 
shift in emphasis from value placed on local knowledge and achievements, to compliance with 
new arrangements and meeting terms inscribed in the proposed contract. Instead of mutually 
created meanings, the TSOs were increasingly asked to take on hierarchically defined discourse 
and meanings. Rather than jointly created organisational sense-making (Weick 1995), parallel 
streams of communication were operating.  
The process of negotiating service contracts persuaded members of TSOs that their 
achievements with extremely difficult young people were being discounted. ‘All that matters to 
them is adopting their approach,’ (Anna, TSO1). TSO members became anxious about future 
funding; and Cora, (TSO 2) described: ‘Getting nowhere, never being listened to.’ Such 
reflections highlighted the extent of breakdown of personal relationships with local government 
officers, symbolised in a perceived lack of respect.  
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Debates about student attendance targets were a major concern in the proposed contracts. Birgit 
(TSO3) explained that the proposed targets were the same as those set for mainstream school 
attendance.  
So, we raise a particular problem … but do these officers see it? They don’t… So [the 
attendance target] it’s now 87% - for each child… they don’t see how different these 
children’s histories are. Some will never manage to come more than say, 60% but it’s 
what they achieve from nothing – zero participation.  
However, the new LEA link officer interpreted the difficulties quite differently, asserting the 
view that TSOs should comply with dominant managerial arrangements.  
They’re living in the past …. I know these projects have been running a long time. As 
individuals, I’m sure they mean well, but…things need planning, targets, outcomes, it 
has to be more focused now. 
His comments demonstrated a wider shift in culture, which the TSO managements were seen 
as resisting.  
Over a ten month period of contract negotiation, disagreements arising from conflicting 
assumptions about meanings, purposes and appropriate specification and targets grew; and 
mistrust pervaded discussions, entrenching differences. During briefing meetings and debriefing 
discussions, the TSO committee members increasingly referred to Rushley officers’ deficiencies 
as professional managers. There was no sense of jointly shared goals for service outcomes to 
support motivational trust, and considerable damage to belief in the individual integrity or 
competence of the other.  
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As mistrust and frustrated communications grew, the level of coercion in the relationship 
increased, with the LEA asserting their right to impose terms. With a number of issues 
pending from earlier meetings and legal advice on the transfer of staff outstanding, each TSO 
received the ‘final Service Level Agreement and Terms and Conditions of Contract for 
signature’ requiring a response by return with,  
Confirmation that you will sign the agreements … [within 7 days], or that you do not 
intend to, so that we can develop alternative providers. (letter, LEA link officer) 
Shocked by the shift to ultimatum, the TSOs MC chairs appealed to elected LEA members by 
letter.  
The new documents, unilaterally impose unreasonable attendance targets and other 
unsought amendments… contain 14 extra pages in legal ‘jargon’, unseen by us before. 
These extend the contract terms and produce significant inconsistencies…Officers’ 
refusal to entertain further discussion is… outside the normal codes of conduct in 
negotiations and demonstrates a derisory attitude towards us…as partners in delivery.  
Performance measures, integral to a professional managerial system, may be couched in a 
language and codes which detach them from any meaningful evaluation (Cochrane 2000). The 
example quoted above went further. Standards and benchmarks designed to monitor production 
line quality had been added to the contract conditions, possibly as a consequence of 
inexperience among officers under pressure from their superiors, in turn responding to central 
Government demands, to conclude this negotiation without compromise . However, attempts to 
coerce did not, in this case, generate capitulation to the more powerful agent, although the loss 
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of trust at all three levels was acute. Instead, pressure induced resistance from the three TSOs 
coupled with disillusionment. 
This example illustrates ways in which coercive pressures from powerful organisational cultures 
can destabilise meaningful communications, devaluing locally defined goals and destroying 
trust. While the ultimatum demonstrates LEA officers’ managerial assumptions about their right 
to control meanings and arrangements (Clarke et al. 2000), it also reflects mistrust in non-
specified arrangements and the other’s competence. Non-compliance on the part of the TSOs 
exacerbated officers’ perceptions of them as untrustworthy partners.  
The TSOs expected to be trusted because of their history of success, while the LEA assumed 
any trustworthy provider would share their managerial discourse or at least accede to the new 
arrangements. Neither party identified the need to build better understanding and relationships 
in the new environment. Better exploration of differences might have helped to build mutual 
understanding. Instead, divergent prior assumptions and subsequent actions cemented distrust in 
relationships and undermined communication. 
This case illustrates the importance of exploring power within inter-organisational relationships 
and shows the transition from co-created meanings to forms of power-based masquerade - first 
persuasive, then coercive - as the LEA and three TSOs moved from joint service endeavours to 
contractually based arrangements for funding and delivery. Deviating from Hardy et al.’s (1998) 
models, however, this case offers few examples of the predictable behaviours identified as 
sustaining adequate surrogates for trust within masquerades.  
Sustaining trust in cross-sector work: competence and motivation 
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In contrast to experiences in Rushley, most Wharton interviewees viewed their local 
government as having shown genuine commitment to improving services in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods and to supporting community organisations. They discussed progress, for 
example, in relation to young people’s projects established through the Children’s Fund, Sure 
Start, Teenage Pregnancy services and other programmes. However, in some cases fragile trust 
was able to grow; in others, the approaches and cultures were inimical to trust- based relations. 
Examples that follow suggest that trust in the integrity of individuals and in their competence 
are inter-dependent. A TSO’s ability to share the funder’s managerial language and to enter a 
discourse in terms framed by the dominant participant were identified as contributing to 
winning a contract; the presence of boundary-spanners and larger organisations’ possession of 
the resources to network or regularly attend consultation meetings were each seen to have 
significant advantages in influencing service and funding outcomes: as Macmillan (2010) also 
identifies.  
There were many criticisms from research participants regarding: top-down approaches to 
planning and change processes; inadequate information and communications; poor conduct of 
meetings; and obscure documentation. Short-term funding and constant changes, with 
consequent effects on organisational and staffing stability, workloads and time were also 
heavily criticised. Thus initial goodwill and trust towards public agencies declined through their 
failure to show respect to community partners. Smaller, less experienced organisations generally 
experienced these issues more keenly, and often felt excluded from discussions, regarding 
themselves as outsiders in arrangements constructed by more powerful organisations. In effect, 
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there was a gap between perceived intentions and practice; between espoused theory and theory-
in-action (Argyris and Schön 1978). 
The fear of an influx of outsiders lacking local knowledge who would ultimately impoverish 
provision was repeatedly voiced, signalling a loss of trust in aims to increase local and user 
participation. However, the introduction of area-based commissioning also placed organisations 
in competition with each other, with SMEs and with larger providers, creating an environment 
increasingly characterised by mistrust. A frontline TSO worker supporting family services 
expressed her mistrust on inappropriate criteria being used to assess services and the exclusion 
of smaller organisations from planning consultations.  
You can be smart, show you meet the criteria, I mean, if you’re big enough to have 
someone dedicated to networking and fundraising but we need to be judged on local 
knowledge and reputation, show we can do the real work, day in, day out, not whether 
we can get to meetings.  
These perceptions of unfairness were exacerbated by poor communication and failure of local 
government officers to visit smaller TSOs and ‘really know… what we do, gain that 
professional understanding’ (TSO worker). If commissioners had visited or engaged in more 
meaningful communications, they might have generated a level of individual, as well as 
competence-based trust and mitigated distrust in the new funding allocation mechanisms. 
A further example from Wharton illustrates the development of co-produced work, suggesting 
that where agencies genuinely collaborate on project delivery, rather than simply engaging in 
formalised partnership (committee) working, trust-based relationships are more likely to result. 
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A small TSO, Family Links, worked alongside members of the Children and Adolescents 
Mental Health Service (CAMHS) to provide home-school support for vulnerable young people 
and families.  
Family Links’ staff identified their access to the CAMHS infrastructure as assisting in some 
time-consuming burdens, such as funding bids and monitoring reports but felt that co-
constructing the project and resolving complementary roles relied heavily on participants’ 
attitudes: ‘it has a lot to do with trust between individuals that makes the project work.’ For 
CAMHS staff, project work with a non-statutory partner allowed them to operate more flexibly 
than if they were bound by normal department regulations, enabling partners to ‘combine 
different strengths’. Thus, the more powerful agency recognised and valued the expertise of the 
other, rather than prescribing its own norms and protocols as the legitimate approaches.  
As other research shows (Edwards 2007), key individuals with good local networks and a 
willingness to set aside organisational hierarchies are important factors in effective inter-
organisational work, whether within or outside contracts. Such willingness opens discussion to 
more meaningful communication and is more likely to generate motivational trust as a basis for 
mutual service learning. This example illustrates benefits from co-constructing a project but also 
highlights costs that need recognition, including the investment of time and energy needed to 
establish trust in joint working from fragile roots.  
Risk transfer and innovation 
Most organisations we studied were small and had inadequate resources to carry risks, such 
as high rates of employee sickness or accident, and faced excessive costs for insuring against 
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these. Some, such as in the Rushley cases, also faced stringent funding penalties for failure 
to meet performance targets, providing examples of failure to share risks for services. The 
Rushley contracts link officer had initially argued that specifying demanding targets ‘sets 
standards to aim towards …to encourage improvement’. However, funding penalties for 
failing to meet these, imposed later in the process further undermined trust in negotiations 
and transferred risks from public agencies to TSOs. Here, as elsewhere, TSOs are providing 
services in fields where the state has failed, in this case, young people out of school. The 
marginalisation of contextual information about the service, in favour only of numeric 
indicators, with attached financial penalties, emphasises poor understanding of the 
challenging nature of the service activities and exacerbates damage to trust.  
In Wharton, a youth centre worker identified how competitive funding cultures and a technicist 
approach to managing and monitoring activities damage openness and trust between different 
youth centres and with local government officers and instead of learning from service 
difficulties encourages their concealment.  
It’s got worse, time was our YO [area youth officer] knew us, now it’s like numbers, 
membership targets, attendance, counting accredited activities... and same time, it’s meant 
to be informal… so there’s issues about …groups sharing problems, like because… 
competing for funding, that’s the bottom line, and it creates dishonesty… people have to 
make the pretence of meeting targets …to survive now, so we lose that chance of working 
together. 
Fragility of motivational trust 
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Many community based TSOs, as in these studies, have previously been recognised for their 
expertise in working with hard to reach groups of people. Establishing unattainable targets for 
services working with challenging users is counter-productive, especially when state services 
have formerly failed these groups. As Cora from TSO2 in Rushley indicates, 
We provide education for disturbed and vulnerable young people; outcomes are extremely 
hard to predict or measure. Insistence on unrealistic targets provides no basis for us to feel 
confident about any future partnership with [Rushley] Council.  
Anna, from TSO1, illustrates this point more blatantly:  
Maybe if the deaf student who had a history of arson, they referred, had set fire to The 
Place, they’d have woken up to the real world…what’s a successful performance 
outcome for him?  
The prescription of targets is argued as necessary for public authorities to manage risks and to 
demonstrate accountability for public funds (Glennerster 2003). However, over-specified 
contracts signal limited trust by purchasers in the professional abilities of service providers and 
in turn, erode providers’’ trust in the competence of the public agency. In cases above, TSOs 
had good track records, potentially enabling realistic expectations about future achievements 
based on situated knowledge. However, in projects and services intended to be innovative, the 
prescription of specific outcomes is neither logical nor fair since performance in new 
developments is notoriously hard to predict (Van de Ven 1999). 
Our final example of a neighbourhood Sure Start project involving multi-agency delivery 
highlights the damage to organisational relationships posed by disruptive policy changes: a 
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further way in which cross-sector trust is eroded, and where the state appears to take little 
responsibility for risks or for seeking to mitigate damage. Sure Start projects have relied on 
generating neighbourhood trust in developmental work to engage hard-to-reach groups. 
However, factors such as fixed-term funding associated with such projects undermine the fragile 
trust developed among participants in public support for neighbourhood work. In the words of 
the co-ordinator, the success of this project which had ‘engaged some parents …from two 
generations without jobs’ was ‘short-lived with the end of Sure Start funding and the decision to 
mainstream developments into wider area based Children’s Centres.’ Another worker 
commented, ‘In two months local parents whose hopes have been raised will lose jobs and the 
children’s projects. We’re letting them down all over again.’  
Involving hard-to-reach, low income families alongside different agencies and workers in 
designing self-help projects, which increase local employment and improve neighbourhood 
facilities, generates motivational trust in joint and supported endeavour. This trust is hard to 
build but easily eroded in the absence of visible means of continuity. The loss of trust in 
individual professional workers, local and national governments will be difficult to repair where 
people see their efforts discounted. In this case, the emotional and financial risks for the project 
failing to survive are carried by those who are most vulnerable but paradoxically were the 
intended project beneficiaries, according to its policy. 
Trust, risk and control: continuity and change in inter-organisational relationships  
As our examples demonstrate, traditional grant-based relationships have increasingly shifted to 
contractual and commissioning arrangements in which differential power relations have 
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undermined communications and trust. All too often, compliance has been read as consensus 
but masks a lack of trust between participants. Some trust literature endorses rigorous structures 
and predictability as creating positive conditions for inter-organisational trust but excludes the 
element of power. Our research indicates that the power to determine norms of behaviour, 
discourse and arrangements, associated with dominant managerial cultures in public agencies 
and heavily specified contracts has, in many cases, pervaded and damaged trust-based 
relationships. Smaller organisations, furthest removed from dominant cultures, excluded from 
information, influence and large-scale contracts, experience devaluation; consequently, their 
trust in public agencies’ commitment to working with them on developmental service outcomes 
is lost.  
Our studies demonstrate an organisational environment which is often hostile to developing or 
sustaining cross-sector trust pervading recent public-third sector relationships: an environment 
where relationships are increasingly governed by competitive interests and excessive levels of 
control through contractual frameworks and audit, with little attention given to relational 
damage or relationship building. Such frameworks serve to manage reputational and financial 
risks for funding agencies but impose new meanings and arrangements which should require re-
negotiation between participating organisations and individuals. With large corporations 
increasingly competing for contracts, the growing distance between providers and purchasers 
generates services that are poorly understood, defined and evaluated, and a shrinking relational 
space in which alternative approaches can be valued. Small community groups are being 
relegated to roles as sub-contractors or, disillusioned, are withdrawing, taking valuable local 
knowledge with them.  
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Our research shows discontinuities and superimposed changes in the funding and policy 
environments that are frequently responsible for eroding initial trust in state actions: where grant 
funding moved to contracting arrangements (Rushley); and where TSOs became casualties of 
new directions (Wharton, Sure Start); or saw specialist work opened to new competitors 
(Wharton). Failures to communicate or to seek to reconstruct mutually the terms and practices 
of these environments aggravate the conditions of distrust, weakening opportunities for 
productive inter-organisational exchange. Despite the promises of greater empowerment of local 
service users and mutual control of services emerging from Coalition Government localism 
policies, many local areas are seeing contracts awarded to corporate ‘outsiders’ and services 
lost. The message from our examples is clear: with the influx of a wider range of bidders, small 
TSOs anticipate that their community-based expertise and commitment to locally responsive 
services will be lost, causing longer term impoverishment of services.  
Further, the codification of services into contracts potentially removes both commissioners and 
providers from the need for effective communication about services so that the fairness of, or 
rationale for, specific performance indicators is concealed. Since providers carry both 
reputational and financial risks for performance outcomes and future funding success, they are 
pressured to maximise their appearance of meeting targets, even if this means obscuring service 
failures from which other TSOs or public agencies might learn. 
Moving from more than a decade of New Labour to Coalition government polices, these kinds 
of challenges have accelerated, with a growing impact on TS mistrust in the state. Support from 
TS infrastructure organisations is rapidly disappearing alongside many longstanding small 
community-based projects (Crawley and Watkin 2011) . TSOs’ special roles as valued 
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‘partners’ in service delivery are being displaced by an open market favouring large 
corporations (Marsden, 2011). Not all of this is new, and continuities are visible in the move to 
progressively larger contracts through which public bodies hope to minimise transaction costs. 
However, the state’s retreat, not just from service delivery, but now from responsibility for 
welfare provision as well, is a massive ideological shift. This has generated multiple and 
accelerated changes in policy, infrastructure and funding, prompting protest campaigns from 
vulnerable community organisations (NCIA 2011).  
Transfer of risk and erosion of trust 
The increased transfer of risk to TSOs emerged from our findings as a significant factor in the 
deterioration of trust relationships and illustrates a further failure in cross-sector understanding, 
drawing attention to the contradiction between a policy rhetoric which promotes empowerment, 
risk-sharing and innovation and TSOs’ practical experiences. Escalating contracts, an 
increasingly risk-averse public sector environment and the rapid turnover of policy initiatives 
have all contributed to this growth of overt and covert shifts in the transfer of risks to TSOs, 
including the recent growth of payment by results. Rather than a risk- and benefits-sharing 
model, these studies reveal a privileging of costs over effectiveness of provision, and services 
that are increasingly circumscribed by regulatory controls. This too, is an arena of concern as 
new contracts attract large corporations, while reducing public responsibilities for finance and 
welfare have become central driving forces in public decision-making.  
How risks are addressed in contracts between public and third sector agencies has received little 
research consideration. Yet our data suggest an inverse relationship between the transfer of risks 
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and trust in relationships, showing how tightly managed contractual risk damages 
communication between purchaser and provider, ultimately impairing service activities and the 
potential for organisational learning. TSOs have increasingly been engaged to devise new 
service approaches for the ‘hardest to reach’ groups in society when conventional approaches 
have failed (Milbourne, 2009). Logically, where innovative provision is intended to overcome 
past failures a priori specification is impossible: fostering innovation conflicts with a regime 
reliant on managing outcomes and risks through measurable targets. Market mechanisms thus 
serve a dual role: as risk management devices for powerful funding bodies; and as means to 
transfer risk from the more powerful to the less powerful – from state body to TSO. Not only do 
these shifts and mechanisms discourage development and organisational learning but they 
contest organisational identities and local accountabilities, imposing others’ interests, values 
and ‘ways of doing things’ (Hoggett, 2004:119) and creating barriers to building co-operative, 
cross-sector work.  
Recognising competence and growing competence based trust 
Our research examples raise questions about how competence and knowledge are judged or 
legitimised, highlighting differences in sector identities and understandings. Whereas public 
agency professionals liaising between sectors were previously domain experts, able to enjoy 
competence-based trust, their responsibility has become managerial audit and contract 
management. In an audit system, meaning is anchored in unilaterally and hierarchically defined 
targets instead of being co-produced; thus, legitimate understandings and local narratives of 
service activities, important to providers and users, are marginalised. Most of our respondents 
reported non-negotiable targets, resulting, as one youth centre worker described, in a conspiracy 
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of over-optimistic reporting to manage the reputational and financial risks associated with 
unrealistic performance expectations in extremely challenging services. Data reporting, based 
on pre-defined targets and in the language of the funder, has displaced narrative based reporting 
where activities might be described though locally generated meanings derived from reflecting 
on practical experience. The strong emphasis on numerical data rather than meaningful 
communication about quality creates unanticipated consequences, in turn posing risks to longer-
term service efficacy, in preventing discussion of failures and inhibiting learning.  
This legitimisation of some approaches over others demonstrates how powerful agencies can 
define the rules of the game (Clegg, 1989) in cross-sector and contractual contexts, undermining 
trust and the kind of openness which could lead to improvements in relations and services. The 
nature of public sector-TSO client-contractor relationships often cements a hierarchical 
imbalance of power that denies all but a masquerade of trust. However, if funding agencies 
adopt a more flexible stance to communications, to understanding and defining service 
activities, there is potential for mutual organisational learning. Otherwise, as the contractual 
environment accelerates, the consequences of mistrust may be inimical to future provision and 
the kind of innovation that politicians have deemed necessary for wider public confidence in 
local services.  
Many examples discussed offer negative insights into cross-sector relationships but we observed 
exceptions in projects involving a joint approach, where common endeavour in frontline service 
delivery overrode norms embedded in dominant management and audit cultures. Such cases 
show that cross-sector trust can be generated and sustained in situations where time and effort 
are jointly invested to understanding and learning from different approaches. However, this 
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demands significant investment in communication and co-creating purposes, meanings and 
values in the project. It also demands the kinds of projects and infrastructural investment which 
are currently being eroded. Trust in these settings can be fragile, often depending on individual 
dispositions and the willingness of representatives from large statutory agencies to relinquish 
accustomed levels of control. However, the benefits for services from this kind of inter-
organisational exchange are significant and would not be feasible within any one organisation 
(Huxham and Vangen, 2004), If conventional modes of operation are replaced by shared 
knowledge and approaches, these secure rather than erode trust and effective inter-
organisational work.  
Conclusion 
Public bodies often behave as though trust in their actions is a given; whereas, all too often, trust 
is a masquerade. This article identifies ways in which trust between sectors has been eroded in a 
changing environment weakening confidence in public agencies. It has therefore highlighted 
approaches that might be more effective in developing inter-organisational relationships and 
building better trust-based services with community providers.  
In the wake of Coalition public funding cuts, TS optimism fostered by localism and Big Society 
strategies has been short lived. From initial celebration of the importance of the third sector’s 
role, it is now evident that much third sector provision will not survive cuts in funding and 
infrastructural support, and the acceleration of new contracting arrangements. Futures based 
upon the emergence of an army of volunteers are illusory, particularly in deprived areas, 
undermining trust in new state projects. The rapid decline in public funding for both state and 
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voluntary services offers little optimism for motivating cross-sector trust, yet this is needed if 
the third sector, as a part of wider civil society, is to carry increasing responsibility (paid or 
voluntary) for social welfare and well-being. Similarly, as accountability for services is 
contractually devolved, there is little evidence of a lessening in the plethora of regulatory 
controls and data-based performance frameworks of new public management practices. 
Reduction in regulatory burden is preached for the business sector but not enacted for civil 
society. 
Among these changes, concern about trust as a means to improve effectiveness in service 
relationships is barely visible; neither is care about effective services; nor the professional 
values of providers; nor achieving goals of social equity and social cohesion. In the current 
economic and political environment, competition and conflict over resources cannot feasibly be 
removed from state-third-private sector relationships and replaced by relationships built around 
trust. However, any commissioning or partnership framework must recognise the problems 
posed by competitive funding and associated approaches to regulation and monitoring, and the 
management of risk; and appreciate the potential benefits of promoting meaningful 
communication, sharing organisational knowledge and encouraging trust-based initiatives. The 
consequences of reviving trust are significant for improving and developing services and thus 
for any renewed emphasis on wider social participation.  
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